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ABSTRACT 
Phishing attacks contribute to a variety of cyber incidents such as data breaches, and ransomware 
attacks. These attackers regularly discuss cyber sensitive topics and keywords, share exploits, 
and ransomware kits through messages in online forums that act as communities of practice. The 
research on correlated cyber risk from phishing attacks is in its infancy. In this research-in-
progress paper, we propose a framework for the assessment of phishing risks in an organization 
and subsequent mitigation through balanced investments in IT security and complimentary cyber 
insurance. First, our framework employs binary classifiers to determine an expert phisher, who 
can launch phishing attacks and the misdetection of phishing URLs in an organization. Second, 
our framework identifies the optimal cyber insurance premium to indemnify the correlated loss 
from undetected phishing attacks. In this manner, the results of this study will assist CTOs to 
plan for balanced cybersecurity investments, and guide cyber insurers to design differentiated 
insurance products under various risk attitudes of organizations. 
Keywords: Information security; dark forums; cyber risk assessment; cyber risk mitigation; 
cyber insurance; Copula; utility models. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Phishing involves social engineering of user data over the Internet to acquire personal and 
business information from innocent users. Attackers exploit the user’s susceptibility to deception 
(Goel et al., 2017) and trick them to divulge critical information unintentionally (Leukfeldt et al., 
2016; Wright et al., 2014). Such information includes login credentials for social networks, 
banking applications, credit cards, and healthcare through emails, corrupt URLs and multimedia 
messages.  
Recently, phishing attacks have contributed to a variety of secondary cyber disasters: data 
breaches, ransomware attacks, business email compromises, tech support frauds, and tax refund 
scams (FBI IC3, 2017). In 2017, the FBI received more than 25,344 complaints about phishing 
attacks where the victims suffered a combined loss of $720 million. In 2015, the US-CERT 
announced a phishing alert for attacks through Kill Disk malware that was delivered via spear-
phishing emails to power, oil and gas companies in Ukraine (ICS-CERT, 2016).  Although 
malicious agents execute these attacks through a set of technical steps, security researchers 
consider phishing as more of an economic problem than a technological one (Akerlof and 
Shiller, 2015). Thus, phishing attacks are a vital concern among organizations that necessitates 
immediate attention and proactive intervention from CTOs (APWG, 2017).  
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Figure 1. ─ Top firms facing phishing attacks in 2017 
Figure 1 shows the number of phishing URLs used by malicious attacks to target users in 2017, 
and verified by PhishTank. We noted that (i) hackers targeted naïve customers by fake PayPal 
domains and counterfeit tech support messages, (ii) a high number of phishing emails with 
technology firm domains such as Facebook, Google, AOL, Microsoft, Apple and Adobe. (iii) the 
number of phishing URLs follow a long tail where the number of highly impacted firms are 
smaller in number, whereas a large number of firms with minimal impact exist (Anderson, 
2008). 
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK TO ASSESS CORRELATED PHISHING RISK AND 
MITIGATION THROUGH CYBER INSURANCE 
Theoretical Foundation 
According to the Opportunity Theory of Crime (Cohen and Felson, 1979), a phisher needs to 
target a gullible victim using Deception (Akerlof and Shiller, 2015) whose IT system does not 
have any effective spam filters, or antivirus to block phishing URLs (Hannon, 2002). This is in 
line with Social Conflict Theory (Pitcher et al., 1978) where expert attackers and naïve users act 
as instigating factors while anti phish filters and perimeter security installations act as inhibiting 
factors for phishing attacks (Biswas and Mukhopadhyay, 2016). The Rational Choice Theory 
(Ehrlich, 1996) suggests that a phisher will weigh the cyber risks versus returns before executing 
an attack. Hence, an accurate estimation of the likelihoods of phisher expertise and efficient 
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detection of suspicious URLs is crucial to minimize phishing attacks. Based on the accuracy of 
these predictions, CTOs can resort to IT security investments and complimentary cyber 
insurance under different risk-taking abilities of a firm (Kahane et al., 1988). Figure 2 shows our 
proposed conceptual framework PRAMCI consisting of phishing-risk assessment, followed by 
risk mitigation. 
Figure 1. – Correlated phishing risk assessment and subsequent mitigation using cyber insurance   
Cyber risk assessment for correlated phishing attacks 
Cyber risk assessment consists of (i) estimation of expert attackers by mining Darknet messages; 
(ii) estimation of the likelihood of phishing attacks; (iii) misdetection of attacks; and expected 
loss under correlated misdetection and phishing attacks. 
Estimation of expert attackers by mining Darknet messages  
Dark forums and hacker communities provide an easy and simple mechanism for malignant 
users to share and discuss technical knowledge and distribute malicious source codes and files 
(Benjamin and Chen, 2012). We employ binomial logistic regression model to classify into two 
hacker roles – “expert” and “novice” (Biswas et al., 2018). Logistic regression can handle such a 
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classification problem. We use the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) and it ensures that the 
probability of hacker follows  in (1), (2). 
                                   (1) 
                                             (2) 
where X1 , X2 , …… X11 are the predictor variables extracted from hacker messages (Samtani, 2016). 
Estimation of the likelihood of phishing attacks  
Each of the organizations out of had installed security technologies and complied with 
industrywide standards in  th year ( ) (Mukhopadhyay et al., 2017). Additionally, they 
conducted IT security audits, up-to-date IT security policies (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2000), 
reported intrusion(s) to enforcement agencies and legal counsels  (Fischer, 2013). Yet  
out of  CTOs reported to the CSI-FBI about a cyber-attack in year , while CTOs 
were not attacked. So,  has two possible states (i.e., attack:  or no attack:  ) with a 
probability of  and respectively, as shown in Eq. (3).  The Logit link function 
approximates the probability of phishing with an exponential form that maps the likelihood 
of attack to [0, 1]. We consider a lag of one year (i) from the time of security deployment 
and impacted users, , (ii) between the legal, regulatory factors , and .  has 
two states ; , and fits a binomial distribution. 
                                  (3) 
                        (4) 
where V1 = β0 + β1 t + β2 Sect-1 + β3 Reg t-1   and pph  = likelihood of phishing attacks. 
Estimation of the likelihood of misdetection of phishing attacks  
The CTO in a bid to prevent the phishing attacks wishes to examine the URLs in emails 
(Valecha et al., 2018) based on features such as address-bar, abnormality, HTML/JavaScript, and 
web-site statistics. Each of the features is encoded as [-1, 0, +1] for [phishing, suspicious, and 
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legitimate] URLs. The CTO intends to classify URLs as phishing (-1) and genuine (+1). 
Therefore, the detection of phishing and genuine URLs is a two-class classification problem (5). 
                   (5) 
where Z1,Z2,Z3,Z4,…Z30 = URL features (Mohammad et al., 2014).   
Expected loss under correlated misdetection and phishing attacks 
Once the organization can distinguish between phishing and genuine URLs, it needs to address 
the residual cyber risks from the undetected phishing URLs.  
                    (6) 
                              (7) 
So, the expected loss  according to Sklar's Theorem (Sklar, 1959) is given by (8). 
           (8)  
where  represents the joint c.d.f. of the expected loss; and  are univariate and 
continuous marginal c.d.f-s; Copula  describes the link in a two-dimensional 
unit-square space and  is unique and differentiable;  denotes the correlation between  
and . We choose Archimedean Copula for the c.d.f of the joint distribution of E(L) with the 
marginal distributions for  and L being exponential (Wolpert, 2000) as shown in (9) and (10). 
   for                        (9) 
                               (10) 
Mitigation through complimentary cyber insurance and security technology 
We propose a cyber-insurance model built on utility theory (Strecker et al., 2011) to recommend 
to the CTOs on possible cyber risk management – transfer outsourced, or in-house (Gordon et 
al., 2003; Dhillon et al., 2017). The PRAMCI framework shows that expert hackers could launch 
phishing attacks, and CTOs can block those attacks using our proposed phishing filter. If the 
filter fails, then the firm faces a possibility to suffer losses. If the CTO has paid a premium (I), 
and received L as full indemnification, assuming the cyber-insurance coverage pays him the 
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entire loss suffered. However, if there is no cyber-insurance, the CTO suffers a loss L. Even if no 
phishing attack occurs, an insured organization would still pay I. Therefore, the CTO compares 
between (i) procuring third-party cyber-insurance or (ii) manage the cyber risk on his own. Eqn. 
(11) – (13) present the decision-making problem for the organization, as illustrated in Figure 3. 
      Objective:  To find   for risk-neutral, risk-averse, and constant-risk types 
s.t. and                                                     (11) 
               
   (12)          
     
                 (13)      
where utility can take a linear, quadratic or exponential functional form for risk-neutral, 
risk-averse, and constant-risk types respectively, and ΔCT = Per unit cost of security. 
    CONCLUSION AND FUTURE STUDY 
Through our preliminary study, we explored and built decision-theoretic models to compare the 
feasibility of proposing cyber insurance in comparison to complimentary security investments. In 
future, we aim to compute the probabilities in (1)-(7) and estimate the parameters of the bivariate 
Archimedean copula of E(L) with empirical data. Our initial analysis revealed that E(L) showed 
a longer tail than exponential (Mukhopadhyay et al., 2017), with almost four times variance. 
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Figure 3. – Decision tree for the insured and uninsured states of an organization 
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